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Abstract—A decade long thrive of cryptocurrency has shown
its potential as a source of alternative-finance and the security
and the robustness of the underpinning blockchain technology.
However, most cryptocurrencies fail to show inimitability and
their meanings in the real world. As a result, they usually start
off as favourites but quickly become the outcasts of the digital
asset market.
The blockchain society attempts to anchor the value of cryp-
tocurrency with real values by employing smart contracts and
link it with computation resources and the digital-productivity
that have value and demands in the real world. But their
attempts have some undesirable effects due to a limited number
of practical applications. This limitation is caused by the dilemma
between high performance and decentralisation (universal join-
ability). The emerging of blockchain sharding models, however,
has offered a possible solution to address this dilemma.
In this paper, we explore a financial model for blockchain
sharding that will build an active link between the value of
cryptocurrency and computation resources as well as the market
and labour behaviours. Our model can adjust the price of
resources and the compensation for maintaining a system based
on those behaviours. We anchor the value of cryptocurrency
by the amount of computation resources participated in and
give the cryptocurrency a meaning as the exchange between
computation resources globally. Finally, we present a working
example which, through financial regularities, regulates the
behaviour of anonymous participants, also incents/discourages
participation dynamically.
Index Terms—Blockchain, alternative finance, financial model,
Cryptocurrency
I. INTRODUCTION
Money is used universally, representing a medium of ex-
change, a unit of account, a store of value, and a standard
of deferred payment [1]. Currency is always associated with
national identity, safeguarded by the sovereignty, required
to be inimitabe and used in daily life by a population [2].
Currency is also a tool and voice in international politics
[3]–[5] - a currency is usually priced by the national power
and nonrenewable resources that a country holds [3], [5].
Centralised currency policies can incent and exploit labour and
productivity, and have coupling effects on market behaviour
[6], [7].
When considering a cryptocurrency, people usually have
the impression that it has loose regulation, high privacy and
fairness [8]–[10]. But people cannot associate the value of a
cryptocurrency with any sovereign or nonrenewable resources
like they do for a normal currency [11]–[13]. That is, cryp-
tocurrencies do not have a value anchor, are less connected to
our daily life, and are not difficult to build or replace in the
current means of human economics.
In technical terms, every transaction in a cryptocurrency
needs to be broadcast to avoid the double-spend problem in
a decentralised environment [14]. However, ordinary people
who hold home desktops, laptops or mobile devices cannot
be expected to do this constantly, nor be able to be fully
synchronised with the environment most of the times [15],
[16]. That is, for most people, their devices will not in be
in the system all the time and only a very small number
of devices compared to the user population will actually act
as maintainers [15]. These phenomena make cryptocurrencies
unreliable and easily abandoned [17]–[20].
Ethereum [21] and other smart contract approaches [21]–
[23] try to form a more decentralised sovereign where “cit-
izens” exchange productivity through smart contracts. How-
ever, this approach tends to result in few citizens actually
doing jobs on the platform, and because blockchains require
all citizens to witness and conduct every job to ensure the
integrity of results by consensus, productivity is reduced. Some
citizens may be disadvantaged, hence eliminated, if the system
does highly sophisticated jobs or an overloaded workflow.
Consequently, the performance of these platforms will stay low
in order to attract citizens, making smart contract platforms not
even being able to perform simple tasks such as powering a
game of digital pet smoothly [24].
With the idea of blockchain sharding [25]–[27] which as-
signs different citizens to do different tasks in parallel securely,
it is promising that productivity can be improved and the
usage of cryptocurrency can be extended to, for example,
exchanging computation power for doing more sophisticated
jobs and increasing performance of computation resources.
Because transactions are divided into shards, the requirement
on citizens’ computation ability and network bandwidth is
much reduced due to reduced workflows, more citizens can
be added to this type of decentralised sovereign, and it makes
it easier for data synchronisation. However, digital citizens are
different from citizens in the real world. Just like characters in
a video game, digital citizens can die and then start again, and
can ignore regulations causing damages without punishments
[28], [29]. Since computation resources are utilised to fulfill
the demand in the real world, the cost of using such resources
has meaning in the real world too [30]. With the smart contract
approach, cryptocurrency money is earned with real effort
and real labour which has a price in reality. Therefore, it
should be possible to regulate digital citizens by, for example,
confiscating their digital assets if they behave inappropriately,
or encouraging citizens to perform jobs by exciting them with
compensation. In this way, it is possible for the system to
stabilise the performance of participated resources without
knowing the source of them in reality or building a credit
base identity.
Grid Computing [31] and Cloud Computing [32] are two
computational models that utilise resources globally through
the Internet. Grid computing attempts to use the idle resources
globally and is a multi aid platform with credit-based identity
model. Cloud computing, on the other hand, is a model where
users buy resource globally owned and priced by a centralised
organisation. We see the popularity of cloud computing in
both industry and academia [33]–[35]. Cloud platforms have
generated considerable revenues [36], and they have changed
the way technology industry operates, including the way to
host a website or buy computation resources. In contrast, Grid
computing is less popular, due to these main difficulties: (1)
needs necessary interfaces for data exchange and job execution
on different devices and using different software to complete a
task. (2) needs to be able to trust job results returned from an
anonymous source. (3) needs to regulate participated devices
worldwide, without having to know the identity of the owners,
and to ensure jobs are delivered correctly and on time.
We believe that blockchains and cryptocurrencies can be
exploited to address some of the problems of Grid computing
we outlined here. The first challenge can be addressed by
the use of smart contracts, which can unify interface of data
exchange and job executions. The second issue can be tackled
by blockchain, especially, blockchain sharding techniques,
where the consensus job results returned from a shard is
guaranteed to be correct as long as the security threshold
is maintained. Compensations and punishments in a cryp-
tocurrency associated with the blockchain can be employed to
address the quality of return. By addressing these issues with
blockchain sharding and smart contract techniques, the Grid
computing techniques may be improved. However, to function
a Grid computing platform and to make it a decentralised
sovereign, economic regulation and policy must serve as a tool
to adjust and control the balance between digital labour and
demand in the market. The problems of inflation, deflation or
even economic break down that exist in real world economy
can also exist in the digital world. Therefore, an economic
model in this type of decentralised sovereign is important to
study.
In the remaining of the paper, we will first introduce
blockchain, smart contract and blockchain sharding. Then, we
discuss an autonomous finance model that use the classical
money supply indicators of M0, M1, M2, and the quantity
theory of money [37], [38] to price a currency by service
demand and to encourage and discourage labour participation
by wages. We use linear regression [39] to set the parameters
to regulate the market and we provide a simulated experiment
at the end of the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Blockchain
Proof of Work (PoW) describes a system that is difficult
to be created but easy to be verified. The most widely used
Proof-of-Work scheme - Hashcash [40], is based on SHA-
256 and was later introduced as a part of Bitcoin (Nakamoto
blockchain) as the computation strength competition method.
There are different kinds of PoW alternatives proposed for
blockchain [41], [42].
A block in Nakamoto blockchain embeds the information
of a period; the blockchain periodically attaches new blocks
to the blockchain. The difficulty is a measure of how difficult
it is to generate a PoW.
Difficulty =
Difficulty 1 target
Current target
(1)
where Difficulty 1 target is a constant 256 bit number
and Current target is a 256 bit number. When calculating
the difficulty for a hash, the hash itself is used as the
Current target, then Difficulty can be derived by (1). The
Nakamoto blockchain network has a global block difficulty:
valid blocks must have a hash below the current target. The
hash is adjusted by changing the value of Nonce (a field
in the block). The global difficulty is adjusted to limit the
rate at which the network can generate one new block in an
approximately fixed time interval.
Nakamoto blockchain has a pre-defined security threshold:
the honest people must take more than 50% of computation
power. This security threshold guarantees that the malicious
people do not have enough power to create a longer fork
branch of blocks when honest people are working on another
branch. New participants can determine the correct records by
staying with the longest chain (the mainchain) and we suppose
this chain is longer than the second-longest chain for at least
a given length.
No one should be able to send the same money to more
than one receiver at the same time; this is the essential require-
ment for a decentralised-cryptocurrency. This requirement is
fulfilled when participants can determine the correct record by
checking whether the sender has spent the money or not in the
history of the mainchain.
B. Smart Contract
A Smart Contract is a Turing Complete [43] computer
protocol that is intended to digitally facilitate, verify, or
enforce the negotiation or performance of a contract [44].
Smart contracts allow the performance of credible transac-
tions without third parties [44], [45]. These transactions are
trackable and irreversible. A smart contract can be used as
a unified interface for job assignment and result verification.
When executing a smart contract, the user transfer an amount
of funding into the smart contract address, each code execution
is priced by the number of lines of codes executed.
C. Blockchain Sharding
Blockchain sharding is an improvement to the basic
blockchain design which aims to achieve a secure consen-
sus together with a sub-group of people among the whole
population. Because the job workload and the nodes are
divided into shards, nodes only need to process the data in
a Shard and mostly communicate with nodes in a shard.
This significantly reduces the requirement on computation
capability and bandwidth. Also, because the shards are running
in parallel, the overall processing ability is also increases
tremendously. The main challenge is to inhibit the chance for
adversaries who do not control the majority people globally but
hold the majority people in a sub-group to temper the record.
To bound the maximum chance for an adversary to gain control
of a sub-group under a given security threshold, the number
of sub-groups (shards) the system can have and the number of
people (node) in the sub-groups are strictly restricted. Also,
the model must fulfill the following requirements: (1) people
cannot choose which subgroup they would be located in; (2)
a transparent and random node assignment scheme must be
employed, meaning no one can predict or manipulate which
shard it is about to be assigned in; (3) the number of shards
must be dynamically adjusted with the change of population.
We can calculate how many times of node assignments is
required to guarantee an Adversary in controlling a Shard. The
probability of obtaining no less than x adversary nodes when
randomly picking a shard sized m (m number of nodes inside
the Shard) can be calculated by the cumulative hypergeometric
distribution function without replacement from a population of
n nodes. Let X denote the random variable corresponding to
the number of adversary nodes in the sampled Shard and t
is the number of adversary. The failure probability for one
committee is at most
Pr[X > [m/2]] =
m∑
X=[m/2]
(tX)(
n−t
m−X)
(nm)
(2)
Figure 1 shows the maximum probability to fail with n =
2000 andm = n/s where s is the number of Shards. As can be
seen from the result, the system has a very high failure chance
when the adversary taken n/2 of nodes. We expect blockchain
sharding approaches to maintain the same n/2 security level
as in the original blockchain systems, but as shown in figure 1,
the most blockchain sharding approaches can only withstand
up to n/3 of nodes being bad, and only a few Shard can exist.
D. N/2 Adversary Resistant Blockchain Sharding
We previous proposed a Jury Hypothesis that serves as
an analogy of an n/2 Byzantine-node tolerate blockchain
sharding approach in [46], which further improves blockchain
sharding.
The Jury hypothesis states that the member of a Jury of
a court comes from the diverse background, so that when a
verdict is reached, it can be seen as the decision was reached
t = n/3 = 666 t = n/2 = 1000
Fig. 1. The chance to fail when n = 2000, t = n/3, t = n/2 and m = n/s
where s is the number of Shards
from the whole society (every class of people). If it takes m
different occupations to form a jury, then when there are a
s number of court hearings running in parallel, there are s
number of people in each one of the m occupation. Table I
shows a court schedule; each court represents a Shard, A is
a person controlled by the Adversary while H is an honest
person.
TABLE I
COURT JURY SCHEDULE
Ocp
Court number
0 1 2 3
Occupation 1 A A A A
Occupation 2 H A H A
Occupation 3 A H A H
Occupation 4 H A H H
Occupation 5 H H H H
It is ruled that a verdict is reached when a pre-defined
T, T > 0.5m number of people inside the jury reached
a consensus. Assuming there exists a random assignment
scheme that assigns people of the same occupation to different
courtrooms where different court hearings are taken place
in parallel. Then, the chance for the Adversary to gain T
spots inside the target courtroom is (assuming without loss of
generality that the adversary puts all its nodes into the front
T occupations)
Pr[T ] =
T∏
i=1
Ai
s
(3)
where Ai is the number of people inside courtroom i who are
controlled by the adversary. To derive the maximised Pr[T ],
we want
∏T
i=1 Ai to be maximised because s is the same. Let
the Adversary has AD number of people inside the system
(Court Jury Schedule), then AD =
∑m
i=1 Ai. To maximise
the value of
∏T
i=1 Ai, we consider
Ai = ⌊AD/T ⌋, i ∈ [1, T − 1] (4)
AT = ⌊AD/T ⌋+AD mod T (5)
This scenario is the maximised because, given any positive
integer X ,
X ∗X > (X − 1) ∗ (X + 1) = X ∗X − 1 (6)
Thus,
Pr[T ]max ≈ (
AD
T ∗ s
)T (7)
Though the adversary cannot manipulate a sentence when it
does not have T people inside a Shard, it can halt a sentence
to be reached when it has m − T + 1 number of the nodes
in a Shard. Then this sentence cannot be made until the next
court (the group of juries are re-selected). Thus, to make the
system function more smoothly, we want T ≈ [m/2] while
meeting the security threshold (e.g. 10−6 failure chance).
Figure 2 shows the maximum failure chance with different
s, n = s ∗ m = 2000, T = 0.7 ∗ m and AD = 1000 (1/2
fraction of the overall population).
s ∈ [2, 600], AD = 1000 = n/2 s ∈ [2, 34], AD = 1000 = n/2
Fig. 2. The chance to fail with different s when n = 2000 and m = n/s
where s is the number of Shards;
As can be seen from the result, when there are ten Shards
and n/2 people being evil, the failure chance is below 10−20,
which significantly outperformed the traditional blockchain
sharding at below 10−6 when it has ten Shards and only
n/3 nodes being evil. If we set the block interval to be
30 minutes, then it takes over 1015 years to fail the system.
If it is 10 minutes (the same as Nakamoto blockchain), it still
takes over 1014 years to fail. If we maintain a 10−6 failure
chance at this circumstance with T = 0.7 ∗m, then there can
be 33 Shards at the same time.
In [47], there is a method that dynamically splits and
combines the occupations to recover the system from a global
halting (all shards are halted at the same time).
III. ECONOMIC MODEL
In this section, we show an economic model for a n/2
Blockchain sharding system with a halting recovery method.
Smart contract is adopted in this blockchain sharding system.
There are a funding pool and three types of accounts in our
model.
1) Transaction Account. An address used for receiving
compensation, keeping funding, and it can send and
receive cryptocurrency to and from others. There is a
fixed amount of transaction fee for every transaction
related to the Transaction account. The fee is submitted
to the funding pool automatically when the transaction
is embedded into a block.
2) Smart Contract Account. A smart contract is associated
with an account; every time the Smart Contract is
executed, an amount of funding is sent to the system
from this account. The funding of a Smart contract
account initially comes from a Transaction account; the
remaining funding can only be transferred back to that
Transaction account.
3) Margin Account. The funding in a Margin account is
frozen and cannot be used during a period.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the accounts and the
funding pool.
Initial funding
distribution
Funding pool
Smart
Contract
account
Transaction
account
Margin
account
Fig. 3. Relationships between accounts and the funding pool
Grid computing models may run in mobile devices. It is
common for mobile devices to go offline without prior notices
due to the lousy network or low battery. This situation will not
affect our model from functioning as long as there is a suffi-
cient number of reliable nodes. We encourage reliable nodes
to participate in the system by giving them compensation.
In order to qualify for the compensation, the nodes need to
first register as reliable nodes. They need to send an amount
of funding from their Transaction account into the Margin
account when registering. This funding will be unfrozen and
being transferred back to the Transaction account if they stay
online for a given period and carry out the duty by voting for
consensus. The compensation is an additional fraction of the
funding sent to the Margin account. The exact number of this
additional fraction is changed by times (which is similar to the
interests in time deposits in real life). If a reliable node goes
offline within the period, the relevant funding in its Margin
account is confiscated to the funding pool.
The price for executing smart contracts are changed time by
time. This price is charged by the system, so that when a Smart
Contract is executed, an amount of funding will be transferred
from the smart contract account of this smart contract to the
funding pool.
The same as Nakamoto blockchain, there is an initial
funding distribution, where there is an amount of new funding
released from the system in every block interval. This funding
gradually reduces to zero block by block. After the initial
funding distribution is finished, the money for executing the
smart contract is the main source of funding for the funding
pool to pay the compensation of the mining game as well as
the compensation for reliable nodes.
A. The Pricing Model
We define the following financial indicators.
1) M0: The amount of currency in Transaction accounts.
2) M1: M1 = M0 + funding in Smart contract accounts.
3) M2: M2 = M1 + funding in Margin accounts.
4) Q: The total lines of smart contract codes executed in a
block interval.
5) P : The price for executing a line code in smart contracts.
6) AV GQ: The average of Q over a long time window.
7) U : The ideal coefficient of the M2 used for executing
smart contracts in a block interval.
P is adjusted in every block interval.
PX =
U ×M2X−1
AV GQ + 1
(8)
where PX , M2X−1 are the P and M2 at the block interval X
and X − 1, respectively.
B. The Rewarding Model
We define the following three indexes.
1) GPLX : The required length of time for a new reliable
node at block interval X to stay online and carry
out the duties. When a node transfers funding to its
Margin account, it will become a reliable node after this
transaction is embedded to a block.1
2) GNX : The number of new reliable nodes at the begin-
ning of the block interval X .
3) I: An indicator of the amount of funding in total to pay
the compensation of nodes which start being reliable
nodes at the beginning of the block interval X .
Let RX be the amount of funding flood to the funding pool
in total during theX−1 block interval. The funding consists of
the transaction fees, the fees for executing the smart contracts
and the money from the initial currency distribution.
In every block iteration, I × RX amount of funding is
remained in the funding pool and will be used to pay the
nodes who start to serve as reliable nodes at block height X
and finish serving at the block heightX+GPLX . Assumed an
unreliable node Alice starts to be reliable at block height X ,
the amount of compensation she will get at the block height
X +GPLX is
MarginAlice
Margin{X}
× I ×RX (9)
where MarginAlice is the funding Alice frozen and
Margin{X} is the total amount of funding that new reliable
nodes at the block interval X frozen.
The ”citizens” who participated in maintaining the system
(propose blocks and/or vote for consensus) in block interval
X − 1 will equally divide the remaining RX at block height
X .
1a node can be multi-reliable if it transfers funding to the Margin account
when it is already a reliable node. The potential confiscation of funding and
the compensation for participating are being count separately.
C. Economic Policies
We define B as a fixed number of M2M1 .
We change the economic policies to make M2M1 ≈ B in every
block interval. If B = 2, meaning, ideally, 50% of the overall
currency should be placed in Margin accounts.
We use the L2 Regularisation [48] to analysis GPL,GN , I
and M2M1 . Let
f(GPLX , GNX , IX ,
M2X
M1X
) = abs(B −
M2X+1
M1X+1
) (10)
where X ∈ [CH − 100, CH − 1), CH is the current block
height.
We can then get the predicted GPLCH ,and ICH of
fmin(GPLCH , GNCH , ICH ,
M2CH
M1CH
)
The predicted GPLCH and ICH then become the GPL and
I at the block height CH .
Because the GPLX , GHX , IX , X ∈ [CH − 100, CH − 1)
are data that every node in the system knows, every node can
calculate the same GPL and I at the block height CH . So
that, the economic policies are derived by the pre-defined rules
instead of decided by some centralised authorities.
D. Interaction Between Currency and Resources
The maximum performance (transactions per second) of a
blockchain sharding system is bound by the number of the
Shards and the pre-defined maximum performance per shard.
Thus, Q has upper limits. When every Shard is fully loaded,
many unconfirmed transactions and smart contracts will be left
in pending status. The funding associated with those pending
transactions and smart contracts will also stay in pending
status. Then, that affects the mobility of funding and decreases
M2
M1
.
Assuming at a block iteration, U ′ ×M2 is the amount of
money used to purchase resources, and AV Q is equal to the
Q at its upper limit (fully loaded). According to equation 8,
when U ′ > U , P goes up, and vice versa.
P affects the purchase demands, as well as the funding
for the rewards. When P go up, the amount of reward is
also increased, this can drive more devices into participating
in the system. When P go down, the amount of reward is
decreased, this surpasses the devices from participation. With
the more devices participated, the more Shards can be formed,
and that changes the upper limit of Q, vice versa. By the
appropriate adjustments of the parameters, we can anchor a
cryptocurrency with demands from the purchase market as
well as the availability of the labour market. There is a deriva-
tion relationship between the exchange of the cryptocurrency
and the resources and the exchange of the resources and
real-world costs (electric bills and other fees to maintain the
computation resources). Thus, the real-world value is placed
to this cryptocurrency by the computation resources serving
as the middle man. Figure 4 shows the relationship between
the cryptocurrency, computation resources and the currency in
real world.
Cryptocurrency
Anchor Resources participated
Currency in real-world
Fig. 4. The relationship between Cryptocurrency, resources and real-world
currency
IV. EXPERIMENT
We simulate 20,000 nodes. They serve both as the user
(the resources buyer) and the service provider (participating
in generate blocks or vote for consensus). We set an amount
of initial purchase demand for every node, which is presented
in Figure 5. The purchase demand of every node is randomly
either increased up to 5% or decreased up to 5% within
every ten block intervals. We set an index called ”fear line”
for every node. ”fear line” is an indicator for if the nodes
should become reliable nodes. For example, if ”citizen” Bob
has 5000 currency, he uses ten currency to buy services, the
time to bankruptcy is 500 block intervals, meaning after 500
block interval he will bankrupt if he continues buying and
is not working. If Bob’s ”fear line” is 500 block intervals
meaning he must start to participate in the system until the
time to bankruptcy is higher than 500 again. Figure 5 shows
the distribution of ”fear line”. When Bob submits funding to
its Margin account, he ensures that he will not be bankrupted
if keep buying resources during the frozen period. If the
condition is fulfilled, Bob will attach a random amount of
funding to the guarantee transaction.
We set B = 2, U = 0.013, and AV GQ is the average Q
over 50 continuous block intervals. 50, 000, 000, 000 amount
of currency are sent in every block iteration in the initial
currency distribution at first. The amount of funding sent out
decreases by 2 in every 100 rounds until it reaches zero. The
experiment lasted 10, 000 block iterations. In the first ten block
iterations, the GPL, GN and I are set to be 0.1, 10, 0.1 and
the AV Q is 5, 000, 000. The upper limit is GPL = 10, 000,
I = 0.8 while the lower limit of I and GPL are 0.0001 and
10, respectively. In this experiment, we use linear Regression
of scikit-learn of python to do the linear regression.
The purpose of the experiment is to show a working
example of our model, the settings are arbitrary, as we cannot
simulate the real usage patterns. The settings are beginning to
be adjusted after the first ten block iterations. The adjustment
of indexes may trigger some nodes to participate the system
by achieving their ”fear line”. The indexes adjustment can be
seen from Figure 6. The price is very stable, and the overall
purchases are also stable while the regression algorithm makes
M2
M1
around B.
Fig. 5. Node Information
Fig. 6. Experiment Results
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored an economic model for
blockchain sharding which is promising to power Grid com-
puting. We attempted to link the price of resources with
the digital labour market (the participation of nodes) and
the resources purchase demand. We also attempt to stabilise
and regulate the anonymous nodes by the financial mortgage.
We bound the settings of Cryptocurrency with the amount
of digital resources in the network. We anchor the value
of cryptocurrency, in this way, the precise meaning of the
cryptocurrency would be: It serves as the exchange among
the computation resources worldwide.
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